In recent days, Russian media has once again propagated the idea that “bombers are useless,” suggesting that not only are Russia’s bomber forces inefficient in combat, but they also have poor survivability, rendering their existence almost meaningless. Notably, this sentiment has emerged at a time when Ukraine has repeatedly attacked Russian airfields, even destroying a Tu-22M bomber.
Russian scholar Roman Skomorokhov published an article titled “Strategic Bombers: Finally Outdated.” He pointed out that currently, only three countries possess strategic bombers: Russia, China, and the United States. By comparison, more nations have aircraft carriers, suggesting that maintaining and developing strategic bombers is even more challenging than carriers.
Skomorokhov believes that most of today’s strategic bombers, including B-1B Lancer, B-2A Spirit, B-52H Stratofortress, H-6K, Tu-22M3 Backfire, Tu-95MS Bear, and Tu-160 Blackjack, were designed at least three decades ago, if not longer. Specifically, the Tu-95MS and B-52H have been in service for over sixty years. Importantly, the technological developments in strategic bombers have remained relatively stagnant over the past 30 years, and the launching of cruise missiles doesn’t necessarily rely on bombers.
In essence, the armament of strategic bombers is quite straightforward. Aside from conventional bombs, they carry precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles of varying ranges, considerably fewer types than other combat aircraft. Their operational purposes are primarily nuclear deterrence and conventional bombing, roles that could be filled by other weapon systems. Moreover, bombers might possess the lowest operational efficiency among them.
For instance, early bombers required extensive range to drop nuclear bombs within enemy territory, challenging them to penetrate modern air defense systems. Therefore, modern bombers mostly deploy cruise missiles. Even so, the efficiency of bombers combined with cruise missiles is inferior to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Cruise missiles, especially subsonic ones, are easier to intercept. Even supersonic cruise missiles face more significant challenges breaching modern defenses than before.
Skomorokhov highlighted that Russia’s bombers, aside from their primary base in Engels, can utilize various domestic airfields like Belaya, Knevichi, Severny, Mozdok, Olenya, Dyagilevo, Kamenka, and Shaikovka. Modern satellites can monitor these airfields 24/7, making bomber movements almost an open secret. Should a large contingent of Russian bombers become airborne, NATO fighters deployed near Russia could quickly intercept them.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict provides a telling example. As soon as Russian bombers take off from Engels airfield, within half an hour, it seems like “half of Ukraine’s air force” is waiting for them!
Thus, in the “triad” of nuclear deterrence, strategic bombers are the least efficient and most vulnerable element.
Skomorokhov asserts that bombers are inherently fragile, possessing limited defensive measures in the air. Additionally, stationary bombers are easy targets. NATO aircraft, launching missiles from Norwegian or Swedish airspace, could easily strike airfields near Moscow.
Evidence of the bombers’ vulnerability is found in Ukraine’s repeated use of drones and special agents to attack deep Russian airfields, destroying multiple military aircraft, including a Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber.
Skomorokhov believes the primary value of bombers at this stage is to distract the enemy. Large-scale deployments of Russia’s Tu-95MS and Tu-160 can shift the focus of US strategic forces, prompting nuclear submarines to withdraw from their bases.
While Russia, the US, and China continue to harness the potential of their current bombers, none seem in a hurry to develop future bombers. Relative to submarines and ICBMs, bombers are too conspicuous, and the most essential capability for these nuclear deterrence weapons is stealth.
In Skomorokhov’s view, only the U.S.’s B-2A bomber ensures battlefield survivability due to its robust stealth capabilities. Neither Russia’s Tu-95MS nor the U.S.’s B-52H would likely penetrate defenses in a large-scale nuclear conflict. B-1B and Tu-160 may have some breakthrough opportunities due to their high-speed capabilities, but they remain limited.
Russia’s tragedy is its limited fleet of Tu-160 bombers, which have a low probability of breaching U.S. defenses, especially compared to the U.S.’s 80 B-1B and B-2A bombers. Russian experts believe that rather than investing heavily in new bombers, Russia would be better off building more nuclear submarines, which have superior survivability.
After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia’s weapon development and production have shifted towards practicality and economy, abandoning many expensive and ambitious projects. In the short term, Russia’s investment in strategic bombers will be limited. However, as a nuclear superpower, maintaining a triad of nuclear deterrence, including stealth strategic bombers, remains crucial.
Source: Wang Yanan