After the historic rendezvous with two U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups, the Shandong aircraft carrier returned to the South China Sea through the Luzon Strait north of the Philippines. It was initially expected that the Shandong fleet would return to Hainan Island for maintenance after the encounter with the U.S. carriers. However, shortly after entering the South China Sea, the Shandong made an unexpected decision—instead of heading towards Hainan, it made a sudden turn, bypassing the Dongsha Islands and sailing north through the Taiwan Strait, giving the impression of encircling the rear of the USS Ronald Reagan and USS Carl Vinson carrier strike groups.
In late October, amid escalating tensions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Shandong urgently set sail into the open ocean, preventing the two U.S. carrier strike groups from reinforcing the Middle East. As a result, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group had to embark on a long journey from the East Coast to the Middle East to provide support and proximity to Iran.
After completing its assigned mission, the Shandong fleet entered the South China Sea through the Luzon Strait. While many anticipated that the fleet would return to its homeport for maintenance, the Shandong, after passing the Dongsha Islands, made a sharp turn northward, sailing through the Taiwan Strait and circling around Taiwan in a U-shaped trajectory.
This move surprised the Taiwanese defense department, prompting them to dispatch Keelung-class destroyers to monitor the Shandong fleet. The Keelung-class destroyer is one of Taiwan’s four main naval vessels, with a displacement of up to 9700 tons. Due to its high fuel consumption and the discontinued production of its components, these destroyers are not routinely deployed for escort missions.
Now, with the Keelung-class destroyer directly monitoring the Shandong, it indicates that the Taiwanese defense department is indeed on edge. However, in the face of the Shandong fleet, the Keelung-class destroyer would be ineffective, and even without the involvement of carrier-based aircraft, the YJ-18A anti-ship missiles on the Type 052D destroyer would be sufficient to sink it.
There are several speculations about the Shandong fleet’s sudden northward movement: Firstly, it could be heading to Dalian Shipyard for maintenance, though this possibility seems unlikely as carriers typically return to shipyards for major overhauls. Secondly, it may be a show of deterrence toward the Taiwan Strait, but the fleet could achieve this effectively in the eastern part of the Taiwan Strait or the Philippine Sea, with a larger operational range. The final possibility is a continued focus on the U.S. aircraft carriers, given the Shandong’s abrupt change in direction indicating new movements by the U.S. carriers.
Simultaneously, the USS Ronald Reagan and USS Carl Vinson carriers, after leaving the Philippine Sea, are also heading north and are currently southeast of the Ryukyu Islands, capable of entering the East China Sea at any time. If the U.S. Navy indeed has the intention to have both carrier strike groups operate in the East China Sea, the Shandong naturally needs to accompany them to avoid the U.S. carriers becoming too unchallenged.
As the Shandong fleet returns to the South China Sea, the U.S. Navy likely breathed a sigh of relief, thinking it could deploy and maneuver without much interference. However, the Shandong fleet made another unexpected move, entering the East China Sea through the Taiwan Strait. This action undoubtedly heightened the tension for the U.S. Navy. Earlier, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force announced joint exercises with the U.S. Navy in mid-November, where the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group was expected to participate in the exercises in waters near Japan.
Of course, this could be a strategic move by the U.S. and Japan to create uncertainty, and the specific mission of the USS Carl Vinson or USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group remains unclear. The entry of the Shandong fleet into the East China Sea poses a serious test for the U.S. Navy. Due to the Shandong fleet’s connection to the People’s Liberation Army’s operational system, even if the U.S. Navy splits one of its two carrier strike groups in the Western Pacific, it still cannot establish a clear advantage against the Shandong fleet.
The decision of the Shandong to cancel its return and continue its mission once again demonstrates the PLA Navy’s ability for urgent deployment and rapid maneuvering. Deputy Commander of the Shandong, Comrade Xu Ying, mentioned in a previous interview that the Shandong has reached its optimal state and will undergo training to maximize its operational capabilities. This statement indicates that the Shandong is fully combat-ready and capable of executing operations in complex and harsh environments.
For the Shandong and its crew, the best test is such emergency deployments and rapid maneuvers. Only when the aircraft carrier, carrier-based aircraft, and the crew are in optimal condition can the perfect combination of personnel and equipment be achieved, allowing for the carrier to be ready to respond, fight, and win in any situation.
The U.S. Navy also places great emphasis on training in carrier operations. Through organizing emergency deployments and rapid maneuver training, they have indeed played a crucial role in real combat situations. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the U.S. Navy had the USS Ford carrier strike group stationed in the eastern Mediterranean to deter Hezbollah, providing Israel with the opportunity to mobilize its national forces. Simultaneously, the USS Eisenhower carrier strike group was sent from the continental U.S. to the Middle East to pose a close threat to Iran.
Facing potential maritime conflicts in the future, the PLA Navy’s carrier fleet needs to conduct high-speed maneuver warfare on the high seas, searching for opportunities, and seizing the initiative to eliminate enemies. Therefore, rapid deployment training is indispensable in routine exercises.
From this perspective, as the PLA Navy’s carrier force grows, becoming more proficient in its operations, it puts increasing pressure on the U.S. Navy’s global force deployment and allocation. U.S. Navy experts acknowledge that due to the vast distance of the Western Pacific from the mainland, they need to maintain 5-6 carriers on the West Coast to ensure that 1-2 carriers are deployed in the forward areas of the Western Pacific. This global military deployment pattern poses significant challenges to the U.S. military.
This is just the beginning of the PLA Navy’s carrier force development. After the commissioning of the Fujian carrier, more domestically produced carriers will join the fleet, compelling the U.S. Navy to redirect more carriers to the Western Pacific. However, this adjustment may lead to a carrier vacuum in other geopolitical hotspots, presenting a dilemma for the U.S. military. (Wang Yanan)