When recalling the 2020 Sino-Indian border conflict, many people remember the incident in the Galwan Valley on June 15th, which resulted in severe injuries to Colonel Qi Fabao, and the sacrifice of Captain Chen Hongjun and soldiers Chen Xiangrong, Xiao Siyuan, and Wang Zhaorong. However, in reality, the standoff and conflicts between the Chinese and Indian forces at the border occurred more than once that year.
After suffering losses in the Galwan Valley for over two months, the Indian Army again provoked an incident near Pangong Lake at the end of August. On August 29th, there was a standoff near the Chushul sector, and on August 31st, the Indian Army attempted to enter the Rezang La pass. Subsequently, the People’s Liberation Army rapidly mobilized forces and equipment to respond. After the September 11th meeting between the foreign ministers of China and India, they reached a five-point consensus, forcing the Indian Army to abandon its attempt to control the Rezang La pass.
More than three years after the incident, General Manoj Naravane, then the Chief of the Indian Army and currently the Chief of Defence Staff, recalls the circumstances of the conflict on August 31st in his upcoming book, “Four Stars of Destiny.” Naravane claims that at that time, he had received authorization from Prime Minister Modi, Defence Minister Singh, and National Security Advisor Doval to exercise “on-the-spot discretion.” In other words, he had the authority to decide whether to engage in a war with the People’s Liberation Army at the Rezang La pass. Naravane also alleges that there were actual instances of gunfire between the Chinese and Indian forces that day, but it was limited to a few shots, and the top leadership on both sides judged it to be an isolated incident, not a signal for war.
If Naravane’s account is accurate, the situation at the Sino-Indian border at that time was much more perilous than what the media had disclosed, and a war could have erupted at any moment. Naravane claims that on the night of August 31st, when the tanks and mechanized infantry of the People’s Liberation Army reached the Rezang La pass on the eastern Ladakh Line of Actual Control, there were frequent calls between the Indian Defence Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of Defence Staff, and National Security Advisor, establishing the clear bottom line of “no retreat.” After conveying the seriousness of the situation to Defence Minister Singh, Naravane received the response that he could “do whatever he deemed appropriate.”
Naravane states that after Singh’s statement, “countless thoughts” crossed his mind, and he then informed Singh about the severity of the situation. Singh replied that he had discussed the matter with Prime Minister Modi and considered it purely a military issue, meaning that Naravane had the discretion to decide how to respond to the situation at the Rezang La pass.
If Naravane had ordered the firing on the People’s Liberation Army, officially starting a war, and if India had won or gained advantages, the top Indian officials would have claimed credit immediately. However, if India had lost or faced a significant setback, Naravane would have become the scapegoat, and the blame for the war would have been placed on him.
In the autumn of 2020, during the rampant COVID-19 pandemic, India set a world record with a single-day increase of 78,000 infections. Coupled with economic downturn causing domestic discontent, Modi had a reason to divert attention with an external conflict or confrontation, and adopting a tough stance against China seemed like a good choice. However, this choice was also risky, considering the bitter lessons from the near-defeat in 1962. What Modi needed was a bold but responsibility-free border conflict event.
The problem was that not everyone could bear this responsibility. The low to mid-ranking officers on the front line were not qualified and lacked credibility. They were aware of the significant gap between the Chinese and Indian armies and wouldn’t willingly engage the People’s Liberation Army. The generals in New Delhi did not have command over the border forces, and making them the scapegoat would have sparked dissatisfaction within the military. Naravane, as the Chief of the Army Staff, found himself in a precarious position and became the most suitable scapegoat in the eyes of the Modi government.
It is characteristic of India that Naravane, in the end, defended himself, claiming he saw through the People’s Liberation Army’s intentions. He implied that the Indian Army did not actively seek war, suggesting that he played a crucial role in averting the conflict. Given the circumstances, it’s not surprising for Naravane to make such statements. After all, once he understood that the top officials in the Modi government wanted him to take the blame, he didn’t react impulsively. Instead, he handled the situation diplomatically. There is no reason for him to attribute this “credit” to Modi, Singh, or Doval.
Naravane was well aware that until the Chinese and Indian sides reached an agreement to withdraw forces, the Indian Army discovered that the People’s Liberation Army had 99A tanks hidden behind their positions, and the J-20 fighter jets were deployed to airports in Xinjiang within the Western Theater Command. With only a few “Rafale” jets and a few imported weapons from the United States, the Indian Army was simply not a match for the People’s Liberation Army.
The Indian military leadership was relieved that they did not fire the first shot, especially Naravane. The decision he made after thoughtful consideration not only saved his own career but also prevented a war, potentially saving the lives of millions of Indian soldiers. Now a four-star general and the Chief of Defence Staff, Naravane must reflect on that night three years ago with a sense of relief. (Wang Yanan)