China’s H-20 Stealth Bomber Set to Emerge: Taiwanese Scholars Discuss Its Role in ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial’ Strategy

Chinese Air Force Deputy Commander Wang Wei recently confirmed that the People’s Liberation Army’s new generation stealth strategic bomber, the H-20, is about to debut. Although Beijing has not publicly disclosed any details regarding its appearance or performance, domestic media still claims it possesses excellent long-range strategic striking capabilities. Taiwanese strategic analysts suggest that the primary objective of this aircraft is not to counter the Taiwanese military but rather to potentially deter allied forces such as the U.S. military from intervening in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese Air Force Deputy Commander Wang Wei stated on March 11th, “The H-20 has been anticipated for a long time, and everyone is looking forward to it. This aircraft has significance for the Air Force, something to be proud of and excited about.” Despite the H-20 not yet being unveiled and its actual appearance remaining undisclosed, a recruitment video released by the PLA in 2021, though brief, has sparked endless speculation. From its configuration to its scene arrangement, the simulated depiction of the H-20, compared to the U.S. B-21 bomber, appears more like a competition than mere imitation.

Chinese media claims that the H-20’s maximum range could reach up to 13,000 kilometers, with a combat radius of about 5,000 kilometers, enabling this independently developed large-scale bomber to conduct strategic long-range strikes. Its stealth capability further enhances its pride across the strait. Once flight tests are completed, it could potentially surpass the United States.

The promotional video for “The Rise of Great Powers” has revealed for the first time a silhouette image suspected to be a new type of long-range bomber, with many believing it could be the “H-20.”

From the J-20, Y-20, to the Z-20, analysts point out that the evolution of PLA weaponry not only reflects its strategic layout but also signifies an improvement in indigenous research and development capabilities, reducing reliance on Russian weaponry.

TVBS, a Taiwanese media outlet, quoted former Taiwanese Air Force F-16 instructor Huang Yangde’s analysis, stating, “Based on the inferred animation clips currently available, the H-20 has three different configurations. One has no tail wings, and we call it a wingtip sail. The second configuration has dual vertical tail wings, and the third one, which is currently visible in the conceptual drawing or model, has vertically deployable dual tail wings. The focus here is on its plasma stealth technology and whether its performance can withstand scrutiny.”

Shu Xiaohuang, Deputy Researcher at the Institute of Communist Party-Military Operations under the PLA National Defense Security Research Institute, remarked, “Considering its operational environment, unlike the U.S. military, which enjoys safety throughout the entire Pacific route, even when deployed to forward bases, the PLA faces extreme aerial threats once it sets sail. Therefore, it must possess excellent stealth capabilities. Additionally, it lacks overseas bases, so its range may need to be very extensive. The H-6 cannot be considered a strategic bomber because of its short range. Therefore, the H-20 may play a significant role in the strategic triangle.”

However, scholars point out that the role assignment of the H-20 is evidently not limited to the Indo-Pacific region, given its long-range, high payload capabilities.

Yang Taiyuan, a researcher at Tamkang University’s Center for Integrative Studies of Strategy and Technology, believes that if the PLA intends to establish a strategic air force, it needs to enhance its long-range strategic projection, including deep strikes and nuclear strikes, and the H-20 must fill this gap to enable the PLA to achieve a “trinity” of nuclear strikes via air platforms.

Furthermore, scholars emphasize the importance of perfecting collaboration among aircraft of the same generation, which is crucial to the PLA’s strategic deployment, a principle that might be seen in the future development of the H-20.

Lastly, Yang Taiyuan added, “The PLA certainly hopes that the H-20 will prevent the U.S. military, including forces destined to reinforce Taiwan or the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, from reaching the Taiwan Strait, giving them more time or space to address the Taiwan issue. This will undoubtedly impact Taiwan’s defense. Therefore, the objective of the H-20 is not only to counter the Taiwanese military but also to influence another battlefield that affects Taiwan.”

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