Since the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States has been actively supporting Israel, deploying aircraft carriers to boost Israel’s morale. There are also reports that American MQ-9 drones have been flying over Gaza to provide battlefield information and target guidance for the Israeli military. This is something China should pay attention to because the use of drones for intelligence gathering and precision strikes has already been effectively utilized by the United States in Ukraine and is now being employed in the Gaza Strip, which suggests that it may be used in the Taiwan Strait in the future.
Although the U.S. military has stated that the MQ-9’s mission in Gaza is to search for hostages, a part of the international community’s efforts to rescue these hostages, it is clear to see that the MQ-9, as a crucial ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) platform, possesses remarkable information-gathering capabilities. This information is of great importance to the Israeli military.
Israel was an early adopter in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles and is considered a powerhouse in this domain, ranking among the top-tier countries alongside the United States and China. Israel has earned a high reputation in the international market for its unmanned aerial technology. The Israeli military also deploys various types of drones, including large, medium, small, and micro drones, which have participated in multiple operations in Gaza, such as Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge.
During these operations, the Israeli military directly integrated drones into its brigade-level units, allowing the brigade command to control these drones, enabling rapid transmission of information to the frontline troops. In addition, the Israeli military has employed loitering munitions, micro drones, and more in the Gaza region to enhance its combat capabilities.
However, due to Israel’s equipment system and limited need for large drones, especially those of MQ-9’s class, they have not been acquired by Israel. This is not because Israel is incapable of developing such drones, but rather because they consider their territory small and their adversaries relatively weak, making the need for such high-end drones unnecessary. Medium-sized drones like the MQ-1 “Gray Eagle” have sufficed for their needs.
The Heron TP large drone from Israel boasts performance that is on par with the MQ-9 and even surpasses it in some aspects. The Heron TP has a maximum takeoff weight of up to 5,700 kilograms and a payload capacity of 2,700 kilograms, both of which exceed the MQ-9’s capabilities, with a maximum takeoff weight of 4,700 kilograms and a payload of 1,300 kilograms. Considering factors such as demand and cost, the Israeli military has not equipped the Heron TP drones, only exporting them to other nations.
Following the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israeli military realized that Hamas may have acquired advanced portable air defense missiles, posing a certain threat to their drones. In response to this situation, the Israeli military felt the need for larger drones, capable of flying at higher altitudes, covering a larger area, and having higher battlefield survivability. Due to a shortage of available drones, Israel urgently sought assistance from Germany.
Previously, Germany had acquired several Heron TP drones from Israel through leasing, with two of them left in Israel for operator training. After careful consideration, Germany approved Israel’s request to use these two Heron TP drones in operations over Gaza, enhancing the Israeli military’s battlefield information-gathering capabilities. However, the number of these drones was too limited, and production was not a quick solution. In this situation, the Israeli military immediately turned to seek assistance from the U.S.
The U.S. possesses a large number of MQ-9 drones and has been engaged in combat missions in the Middle East for an extended period, accumulating valuable combat experience. The U.S. readily deployed MQ-9 drones over Gaza to assist the Israeli military in gathering battlefield information, ostensibly under the guise of searching for international hostages. It is speculated that U.S. special forces may also have entered Gaza to support the Israeli military in their operations.
For the Israeli military, the MQ-9 drones hold great value, as they can provide high-altitude battlefield oversight, utilize synthetic aperture radar to obtain large-area battlefield images, and perform detailed target identification using electro-optical payloads. Moreover, they can compare target images taken at different times to identify the presence of landmines or roadside bombs, thus reducing Israeli casualties. Israel, being a small nation with a limited population, cannot afford significant casualties. Additionally, the MQ-9 drones fly at altitudes above 5,000 meters and are U.S. military assets, making them less likely targets for Hamas at this time, providing the Israeli military with a stable source of battlefield intelligence, making them highly valuable.
For the U.S. military, this type of off-shore interference validates the concept of “offshore intervention.” Offshore intervention involves the U.S. not directly engaging in conflicts but using unmanned aerial vehicles or space-based integrated information systems to provide ISR support, enhancing one side’s combat capabilities. This concept was exemplified on the Ukrainian battlefield, where U.S. MQ-9 drones took off from Romania, frequently entered the Black Sea area, approached the Ukrainian eastern coast, and even Crimea, gathering intelligence on Russian communication, ground deployments, naval and aerial activity patterns, supporting Ukraine’s ground actions and long-range air and sea strikes.
With the support of the U.S. and NATO intelligence, Ukraine identified the weak points in the Russian military’s deployment, leading to significant victories during the autumn 2022 counteroffensive, including the control of most of the Kharkiv region. The large-scale airstrikes on Crimea and raids on Russian naval bases were also aided by MQ-9 reconnaissance.
For the U.S. military, these off-shore drone deployments have a very low cost, even if a few drones are shot down. They are flexible, serving as a preliminary step before deep intervention, understanding the adversary’s limits and preparing the groundwork for subsequent actions. They can also exit the operation promptly after sustaining losses to mitigate further risks.
For China, it is crucial to remain vigilant against such off-shore interventions by the U.S. In future scenarios, such as in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. is likely to employ this “offshore intervention” approach. Direct involvement in a conflict poses significant risks for the U.S., but they cannot simply stand by if the People’s Liberation Army gains control of the Taiwan Strait. In addition to deploying aircraft carrier strike groups, amphibious expeditionary groups, and various combat aircraft, the U.S. will undoubtedly dispatch drones to the Taiwan Strait at the earliest opportunity to gather intelligence on our deployments and provide ISR support to the Taiwanese military.
Effectively detecting and neutralizing U.S. drones in a timely manner will be a critical challenge for China. Serious analysis and research are needed to identify weaknesses in order to develop effective countermeasures. (Wang Yanan)
