According to a December 18 report from the Russian “Independent,” cited by “Reference News,” the Turkish military is exploring the possibility of acquiring the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet (or FC-1 “Xiaolong”) jointly manufactured by China Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC) and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC).
Reportedly, Turkey’s sudden interest in the JF-17 Thunder stems from challenges in its fighter jet modernization efforts. Attempts to procure F-16V fighter jets from the United States faced uncertainty, while efforts to purchase EF-2000 fighter jets from Europe encountered difficulties. Frustrated with these setbacks, Turkey turned to China and recalled JF-17 Thunder, a third-generation fighter jet jointly developed by China and Pakistan, making it the only independently manufactured third-generation fighter in the Islamic world. Consequently, the idea of acquiring the JF-17 Thunder naturally emerged.
**Why Turkey Reconsiders JF-17 Thunder Purchase**
Is Turkey’s intention to buy the JF-17 Thunder jet plausible? Recalling the unpleasant incident in previous years when Turkey attempted to negotiate the export of the FD-2000 air defense missile system with China, skepticism arises. However, the current situation differs as Turkey faces not the issue of pricing but the reluctance of NATO countries to sell advanced fighter jets. The F-35A is off the table, and attempts to acquire the F-16V from the U.S. have been repeatedly blocked.
Until May of this year, Turkey, capitalizing on Sweden and Finland’s NATO entry, engaged in intensive negotiations with the U.S. Sullivan expressed a willingness to sell F-16V Block70 if Turkey agreed to Sweden’s NATO entry. Although it seemed the matter had concluded, complications arose when the U.S. congressional approval process for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) remained stuck, with Democratic Senator Menendez finding reasons to impede the F-16 sale to Turkey, attaching conditions such as improving Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds.
These conditions were evidently unacceptable to Turkey, and the anticipated sale of F-16V Block70, initially expected to be finalized this year, has been continually delayed, leaving Turkey frustrated. With F-16V Block70 appearing unreliable, Turkey proposed an alternative plan, attempting to purchase a batch of EF-2000 fighter jets from Europe.
As early as 2005, Turkey expressed interest in buying EF-2000, intending to leverage it as a bargaining chip against the U.S. In 2007, the U.S. granted Turkey permission to acquire 30 F-16C/D Block50+, repeating a similar strategy. In November of this year, Turkey issued military procurement offers to the UK, Spain, Italy, and Germany regarding the EF-2000 fighter jet. While the UK and Spain readily agreed, Germany, citing Turkey’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, refused to export the EF-2000 fighter jets to Turkey.
This rejection may be a surface reason, with deeper implications involving contradictions between Turkey and NATO. Turkey, aiming to negotiate with both Europe and the U.S., unexpectedly found itself surrounded as the U.S. and Germany, both NATO members, presented a united front. In the end, the anticipated sale of F-16V Block70 to Turkey, expected to conclude this year, remains unapproved, leaving Turkey in a perplexing situation.
**Turkey’s Air Force Dilemma**
In terms of upgrading its tactical aircraft, Turkey finds itself in a frustrating predicament. Relying on the U.S. has proven challenging due to increased demands, Europe has shown resistance, and Turkey’s aerospace industry capabilities are limited. The aspiration to independently upgrade existing F-16C/D to F-16V, even if possible, would likely fall short of the U.S. production capacity.
Adding to the dilemma, Turkey’s main air force adversary, the Greek Air Force, has recently undergone significant upgrades. In 2022, Lockheed Martin began upgrading Greece’s F-16V fighter jets, and in September 2022, the first batch of 2 aircraft was delivered. All 83 F-16V fighter jets are expected to be upgraded by 2027. Moreover, Greece signed a contract in 2021 to purchase 24 Rafale fighter jets from France, with delivery expected to be completed next year.
Compared to Turkey’s F-16C/D, Greece’s F-16V and Rafale boast advanced features such as active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, new electronic warfare equipment, and mission computers. In terms of beyond-visual-range interception capability and multi-role capability, Greece’s air force surpasses Turkey’s. In terms of equipment updates, Turkey’s air force is already lagging behind Greece’s, and if Turkey continues to procrastinate without clarity on its upgraded third-generation aircraft, it may find itself at a disadvantage once Greece completes its equipment updates.
In this sense, Turkey’s air force equipment is not comparable to 2005 or 2017. During those years, Turkey’s military did not lack military equipment from the West, and engaging with China or Russia was merely an attempt to extract more concessions from the West. In other words, Turkey sought to negotiate with the West, holding us as a bargaining chip, suggesting, “If you don’t give me more, I’ll go eat somewhere else!”
Looking at 2023, Turkey faces the challenge that the “restaurant chef” is less inclined to cook for Turkey. The chef points out flaws, from Turkey’s attire to its informal demeanor, and questions its choice of footwear. The nature of the situation has changed, and Turkey’s dependence on Western equipment, being a NATO member, is challenging to eliminate in the short term. However, Turkey is gradually becoming an anomaly within NATO, with deteriorating relations with the EU leading to a declining position within the EU system. This is a fact.
This complicates Turkey’s foreign military purchases, initially seen as a negotiation tactic within NATO, showcasing us as a mascot. However, as the bargaining chip accumulates, there might be a day when it plays out unexpectedly. In the end, NATO might say, “I don’t care about you, Turkey. Buy whatever you want!” or the relationship between Turkey and NATO may deteriorate to the point where they no longer cooperate, becoming indifferent to each other’s wishes.
It’s possible that, under the current circumstances where NATO countries easily draw lines, Turkey’s behavior of balancing multiple sides clashes with its nature. This could become a variable in the relationship between Turkey and NATO. Perhaps, at that time, what was initially pretense becomes reality, the bargaining chip becomes the main character, and Turkey, initially intending to buy F-16V, eventually turns to China to purchase JF-17 Thunder. After all, isn’t this how Iran approached things? In this magical world, anything is possible, and all we can do is patiently await the unfolding changes.
