The Indian military realizes that if they continue to delay their indigenous stealth fighter jet project, not only could China potentially have over 500 J-20s, but even Pakistan, India’s arch-rival, could equip itself with hundreds of J-35 stealth aircraft in the future. The combined force of these 600 fifth-generation fighter jets would pose a comprehensive threat to India.
Recently, with the successful maiden flight of Turkey’s “TAI TF Kaan” fighter jet prototype, the dormant club of fifth-generation aircraft welcomed a new member.
This event caused significant waves globally. Firstly, no one expected Turkey, a newcomer in the aviation field with no prior record of indigenous military aircraft development, to produce such a feat. Secondly, Turkey’s success shattered the perception that fifth-generation jets were exclusively the domain of industrial giants, prompting many nations to believe they too could achieve similar feats.
India stands as a typical example among these aspiring nations. The success of the “Kaan” served as a shot in the arm, prompting the Indian Air Force to accelerate its indigenous project further.
Back in 2006, India had plans to develop a fifth-generation fighter jet based on the LCA Tejas fighter aircraft. By 2009, the Indian Air Force had outlined design specifications, establishing the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (ACMA) project as its core focus, pushing it into the feasibility stage.
However, much like the decades-long saga of the LCA project, the ACMA project has only managed to showcase a few models or concept drawings at air shows, without any tangible progress.
Before the maiden flight of Turkey’s “Kaan” prototype, India wasn’t overly concerned. Pakistan, its arch-rival, lacked fifth-generation aircraft, and despite procuring J-10CE jets from China, the constraints on the Pakistan Air Force’s scale made it challenging to pose a strategic threat to the Indian Air Force.
In contrast, although the Chinese Air Force had the capability to strategically outmatch the Indian Air Force with J-20 fighter jets, India believed that the high-altitude environment of the Sino-Indian border region would significantly restrict the operational deployment of the J-20. Additionally, the People’s Liberation Army had to allocate resources to multiple strategic directions, including the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, all requiring J-20 deployments.
Many Indian Air Force senior officials confidently stated in public that the Rafale could suppress the J-20 because they believed the PLA lacked the capability to deploy sufficient J-20s in the border region and even if deployed, the harsh conditions would degrade the J-20’s performance to that of the Rafale. At that time, the Indian military could leverage its numerical advantage to offset the J-20’s performance superiority.
However, with the maiden flight of the “Kaan” prototype, India suddenly realized that the situation was changing. On the one hand, Pakistan was also involved in the “Kaan” fighter jet project, and its maiden flight provided the Pakistan Air Force with another channel to acquire fifth-generation aircraft after China’s J-35.
On the other hand, Turkey’s entry into the fifth-generation aircraft club prompted some overseas research institutions to conduct a new round of statistics and estimations on the production and deployment of stealth fighter jets globally.
Although the initial purpose of this statistical analysis was to assess the export prospects of the “Kaan” fighter jet, it revealed that China’s annual production of J-20 fighter jets had reached three digits and still had room for further increase.
This led to widespread speculation that China’s deployment of J-20 fighter jets could exceed 500 within three years, considering the ongoing development progress and the imminent induction of the J-35 fighter jet. Numerous signs indicate that the strategic pressure facing the Indian Air Force will sharply increase in the visible future, to the extent that by 2026, the Indian Air Force with 500 J-20s would find itself in an overwhelmingly disadvantaged position regarding the Sino-Indian border issue.
Moreover, as the J-35 is highly likely to be used for both domestic and export purposes, its deployment represents a form of export license. This means that the Pakistani Air Force may acquire Chinese J-35 stealth fighter jets even before acquiring the “Kaan” fighter jet, establishing a significant advantage over the Indian Air Force.
In this scenario, it’s entirely reasonable for the Indian Air Force to accelerate the ACMA project after the maiden flight of the “Kaan” prototype. After all, if they don’t develop indigenous stealth fighter jets soon, the Pakistani Air Force alone could exert tremendous strategic pressure on India in the near future. Coupled with the Chinese Air Force’s deployment along the border, India would find itself strategically disadvantaged in the entire northern region.
However, whether India can accelerate the ACMA project remains uncertain. The success of Turkey’s “Kaan” fighter jet owes much to assistance from British BAE Systems, and the extensive use of components from other Western countries makes the “Kaan” essentially an international collaborative project akin to the F-35, significantly reducing Turkey’s own development pressure.
In contrast, due to India’s desire to break free from the label of “made by multiple nations” with the ACMA project, there is a demand for a significant use of domestically produced components. Consequently, the progress of the ACMA project directly correlates with the development of India’s domestic aerospace industry, making it highly unstable.
This makes it difficult for India to push forward the development of the project solely based on subjective intentions, potentially leaving the ACMA project still in the research phase when Pakistan is capable of equipping itself with stealth fighter jets. (Jiang Fuwei)
