The hottest news these days is undoubtedly the PLA Eastern Theater Command’s “Joint Sword-2024A” multi-service joint exercise in and around the Taiwan Strait. After all, this is a highly directed and extremely clear real-combat exercise. The scale is so large that the Fujian’s second departure, just half a month after its first sea trial, has gone almost unnoticed.
More notably, the reason for the Fujian’s second departure is clearly not a simple test of its sailing capabilities. Its destination is the northern Yellow Sea, over 800 kilometers from Jiangnan Shipyard. Considering that the carrier-based aircraft training base in Xingcheng, Liaoning, is nearby, many speculate that the Fujian is heading north to the Yellow Sea to receive carrier-based aircraft and conduct preliminary take-off and landing tests.
The Fujian’s first sea trial began on May 1 and returned to Jiangnan Shipyard on the afternoon of May 8. According to the Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration’s notice, traffic control for inbound and outbound ships and the waters around Changxing Island Pier was implemented from 9:10 AM to 3:40 PM on May 23.
Calculating from this, the Fujian only stayed in the port at Jiangnan Shipyard for half a month after its first sea trial. For a giant ship 316 meters long, 78 meters wide, and over 80,000 tons, this time is hardly enough for even basic cleaning. This further proves that the first sea trial was very successful, exposing only minor issues that could be resolved in just a few days, hence the short turnaround for the second sea trial.
What the public is most concerned about is what the Fujian will be testing in its second sea trial. The answer lies in the Dalian Maritime Safety Administration’s notice. On the morning of May 22, the Dalian Maritime Safety Administration issued a notice for a military mission, warning that from 10 AM on May 24 to 10 AM on June 11, certain areas in the northern Yellow Sea would be closed for a military mission, advising passing ships not to enter.
During the Fujian’s second sea trial, only a navigational control notice was issued for the East China Sea, whereas the Yellow Sea saw a closed area designated. Photos also showed that the Fujian’s draft had significantly increased compared to its first departure, indicating a substantial increase in tonnage.
Ship tonnage can vary under different conditions, typically described as “light displacement,” “standard displacement,” and “full load displacement.” The Fujian’s full load displacement exceeds 80,000 tons, but its standard displacement might be less.
The Fujian’s increased draft during its second departure suggests it has loaded more fuel, water, or other necessary supplies, clearly preparing for a longer and farther voyage.
Given the proximity of the carrier-based aircraft training base in Xingcheng, it can be confirmed that the Fujian will conduct an 18-day sea trial in the northern Yellow Sea, during which carrier-based aircraft will take off and land for the first time, testing the crucial capability of launching and recovering aircraft.
Undoubtedly, this presents a significant new challenge for PLA carrier-based fixed-wing aviation, mainly due to the electromagnetic catapult/arresting system. Previously, the Liaoning and Shandong used ski-jump ramps, which required less demanding piloting skills and proficiency. The ski-jump ramp provides an upward flight attitude upon takeoff, making it easier for aircraft to take off by simply increasing throttle.
According to the U.S. Navy’s experience, flat-deck carrier-based aircraft tend to have a noticeable drop due to gravity and airflow after leaving the deck. If pilots do not control the flight attitude properly, they risk crashing into the sea due to insufficient speed or large waves.
The catapult alleviates this problem to some extent. After switching the main carrier-based aircraft from the heavy F-14A “Tomcat” to the medium F/A-18 “Hornet,” the issue of aircraft drop essentially disappeared, though risks remain.
For PLA Navy pilots, the electromagnetic catapult/arresting system may provide more initial speed compared to the U.S. Navy’s steam catapults, allowing for easier takeoffs. However, lessons learned from the U.S.’s bloodshed are still valuable.
If the electromagnetic catapult/arresting system can indeed offer higher initial speeds and reduce landing rollout distances, pilots will experience significant instantaneous g-forces during takeoff and landing.
This suggests that the first batch of pilots conducting carrier-based aircraft takeoff and landing tests on the Fujian will be highly experienced and physically robust “veterans,” as less sturdy pilots might not withstand the rapid changes in g-forces.
There is also much speculation about which aircraft will first conduct these tests. The Fujian is expected to carry various aircraft, including the J-15B, J-15D, J-35, JL-10H, KJ-600, and Z-20F. At first glance, it seems challenging to choose.
However, considering that the core combat capability of an aircraft carrier lies in its heavy fighters and the critical electromagnetic catapult/arresting system, the early tests will likely be conducted by the most mature J-15B.
The Z-20F or Z-18 helicopters might also undergo tests simultaneously because helicopter operations on a carrier are relatively less challenging. Additionally, carrier-based helicopters play essential roles in rescue, anti-submarine, and commuting tasks. Starting these tests earlier or using them during the test period for transportation and emergencies is highly probable.
However, the most notable aspect is that the Fujian began its second sea trial so soon, suggesting that the first sea trial’s success alone might be an oversimplification. The Shandong, for example, only conducted carrier-based aircraft takeoff and landing tests during its sixth sea trial.
The most compelling reason is the rapid changes in the international situation. NATO’s involvement in Ukraine is increasingly likely, a new round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deepening, the Philippines is collaborating with the U.S. to stir trouble in the South China Sea, India is intent on causing trouble in the Himalayas, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait is worsening due to the local elections and the growing arrogance of “Taiwan independence” forces.
Time waits for no one. It is uncertain how much relatively peaceful time China has left, and the time available for military development is also unknown. As the core equipment of the PLA’s new generation of integrated maritime control warfare, the Fujian must make the most of every minute and second to train.
