U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley had twice called Li Zuocheng, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, saying he was worried that then-President Trump might declare war on China, the Washington Post reported on the 14th.
Mark Milley twice called Li Zuocheng on Oct. 30, 2020, four days before the U.S. presidential election, and Jan. 8, 2021, two days after Washington’s Congress was stormed by Trump supporters, according to Chinese media reports citing the Washington Post.
In both calls, Milley tried to reassure the Chinese military brass that the United States would not launch an attack and said he would alert the Chinese in advance if an attack was to occur.
In response, Li Haidong, a professor at the China Foreign Affairs Academy and an expert on U.S. affairs, said yesterday that this incident is hardly good news for U.S.-China relations.
Li believes that Bob Woodward’s report will lead to further “self-censorship” in the United States, the extreme China hawks will seize this matter and eliminate the buffer zones or gaps in Sino-US relations, which is what China needs to pay attention to.
He said that judging from the current reactions of various parties in the United States, any individual or department with flexible performance in the United States’ next China policy will receive “key attention”. In the subsequent decision-making, the “centrist” may slowly disappear, this is the real worrying and disturbing place.
Mark Milley, as the military’s top commander, has the same idea of “not going to war with China” that the mainstream American elite has. But the danger is that the political polarization of the United States may make it difficult for China to judge Washington with “normal behaviors.”
Li Haidong said that the polarization or extremism of U.S. politics will lead to the gradual marginalization of the pragmatic middle course in the policy-making process, which may eventually become a tributary.
“It is usually assumed that the mainstream views among the political elite will be implemented into mainstream policies, but in reality, the pathology of U.S. domestic politics has led to a high degree of uncertainty that this is not bound to happen in the United States. As the space for compromise becomes thinner or even disappears altogether, the main posture of assertiveness toward China will become more apparent.”
