Su Qi, the former Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council and chairman of the Taipei Forum Foundation, pointed out that if Taiwan’s role as a contested pawn between China and the U.S. could be reduced, it would diminish the tensions and likelihood of conflict between the two superpowers. Such a shift would not only spare Taiwan, the primary potential casualty, but also give other regional countries a sigh of relief. He believes the most optimal solution to downplay Taiwan’s contested status is the “Cross-Strait Dialogue,” followed by the “US-China Dialogue.” If both dialogue paths are blocked, “Beijing might think that it has exhausted all peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue and only non-peaceful measures remain at a time they deem suitable.”
Speaking at a seminar titled “Semiconductor Policy Workshop: Developing a Win-Win Strategy for the United States, Taiwan, and Partners,” jointly hosted by the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science (TSE) and The Stimson Center on September 15, Su discussed “Taiwan’s Role in US-China Competition.”
Delving into the historical context between Taiwan and US-China relations from 1988 to 2008, he highlighted numerous policy initiatives Taiwan took that triggered positive or negative responses from the US and China. Some of these actions include “Cross-Strait Talks,” “One China, Respective Interpretations,” and others. He emphasized two major reasons for Taiwan’s impactful policies: America’s tolerance towards Taiwan, and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) self-restraint. For the U.S., supporting Taiwan’s democracy, influencing Mainland China’s opening and eventual democratization, and hoping for Taiwan’s economic success to integrate China into the global economy were key motives. On the other hand, the CCP’s restraint stemmed from the belief that close ties with Taiwan would help future reunification and learning from Taiwan’s successful economic growth.
Expressing concerns over the evolving power dynamics, Su described Taiwan as a “bone being fought over by two dogs.” While America’s stance on Taiwan adjusts to strategy, democracy, and ally reliability, China’s considerations are getting complex. With the evident pro-independence trend of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, the sentiment in mainland China is gravitating towards the fear of “losing Taiwan,” potentially casting Xi Jinping as a historic “culprit.” Strategically, Taiwan’s location near vital chokepoints makes it even more valuable. Lastly, the previous dove-like perspective within China, which emphasized waiting for an opportune moment for reunification, is now overshadowed by a more hawkish view advocating for quicker resolutions, especially if Taiwan strengthens its cooperation with the U.S.
In conclusion, Su emphasized the importance of dialogues. If the dialogues fail, Beijing might consider non-peaceful means, potentially reshaping the geopolitics of not just East Asia but the entire world.
