Ground Forces Sector – A report aired by the Liberation Army Daily in late June 2026 offered a brief look at an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) detachment from a PLA Army brigade conducting live drills in the high-temperature, sandstorm conditions of the Gobi Desert. The report named neither the missile nor the unit, but between the training it described and the imagery it carried, there is plenty worth unpacking — because it points to where China’s mobile anti-armor doctrine is heading.
According to the report, the detachment maneuvered to a desert firing position, engaged a simulated armored column at extended range, and then carried out a sequence of more demanding tasks: re-designating targets mid-engagement after a reconnaissance drone spotted a higher-value asset, reacting to simulated jamming and counter-reconnaissance, and finally transitioning to night operations. The stated aim was to “explore the operational boundaries” of the weapon systems involved.
The capability that stands out: changing targets after launch
The most notable element was mid-flight target reassignment: a drone identifies a more valuable target while a missile is already in flight, and the operator switches to it. This is only possible with a missile that keeps a two-way data link to its operator after launch, rather than a pure “fire-and-forget” weapon that locks on before launch and cannot be redirected. That “man-in-the-loop” capability is associated with China’s heavier, fiber-optic-guided anti-tank missiles — and it matters because it lets a crew fire from concealment, switch to priority targets like command vehicles, and abort against decoys, all after launch.
Identifying the system: almost certainly the HJ-10
The imagery tells us more than the text does. One frame shows a tracked launch vehicle firing a missile from a roof-mounted box launcher, with a retractable electro-optical mast visible — a configuration that points almost unmistakably to the AFT-10, the ZBD-04A-based carrier for the HJ-10 (Red Arrow-10). Another shows the missile boxes being crane-loaded onto that launcher, consistent with the same system. The official report did not name the missile, and strictly speaking a positive identification from broadcast footage is an inference rather than a confirmation — but for anyone familiar with PLA ground equipment, this particular silhouette is a well-established one, and the read is a confident one.
A recent, named precedent
This also did not come out of nowhere. In May 2025, China’s Ministry of National Defense publicly reported the 74th Group Army testing the HJ-10 anti-tank missile — also in the Gobi Desert, and with a similar emphasis on long-range, mobile engagement. The HJ-10 is a vehicle-mounted, fiber-optic-guided system with a range reported at around 10 km, a tandem warhead designed to defeat reactive armor, and exactly the kind of post-launch retargeting capability described in this latest drill. The June 2026 footage fits a clearly established pattern of training China has been willing to publicize.
Where the HJ-10 sits among China’s anti-tank missiles
China’s anti-tank missile lineage runs from the old wire-guided HJ-8, through the laser-guided HJ-9, to two systems that anchor the current force: the man-portable HJ-12 and the heavier, vehicle-mounted HJ-10. The two represent different philosophies, and it is useful to see them alongside their closest Western counterparts.
| System | HJ-10 (China) | HJ-12 (China) | FGM-148 Javelin (USA) | Spike-ER (Israel) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class | Vehicle-mounted, heavy | Man-portable | Man-portable | Vehicle / man-portable |
| Reported range | ~10 km | ~2–4 km | ~2.5–4 km | ~8 km |
| Guidance | Fiber-optic, two-way link | IIR fire-and-forget | IIR fire-and-forget | Electro-optic, fiber link |
| Post-launch retargeting | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Primary role | Long-range anti-armor screen | Infantry anti-tank | Infantry anti-tank | Multi-role precision strike |
The comparison highlights something specific about the HJ-10. The widely fielded Western infantry weapons — the Javelin above all — are built around “fire-and-forget” simplicity: lock on, launch, take cover. That is excellent for a small infantry team, but it gives up the ability to change your mind after launch. The HJ-10, like Israel’s Spike family, trades that simplicity for reach and a man-in-the-loop link. At roughly 10 km, it is less an infantry weapon than a mobile anti-armor node — meant to sit at standoff distance, screen avenues of approach, and strike before enemy armor can close. The drone-cued, mid-flight retargeting shown in the latest drill is exactly the kind of tactic that longer range and a two-way link are meant to enable.
The bigger point: the missile is only as good as the network
What the Gobi footage really illustrates is not a single weapon’s specs — it is a way of fighting. A reconnaissance drone finds the target, a command vehicle assigns it, a missile crew fires from a concealed position, and the target can be switched mid-flight as the picture changes. The missile is one node in a sensor-to-shooter chain; its battlefield value depends as much on the drones, data links, and command procedures around it as on its own range or warhead. Training in the open, austere terrain of the Gobi — where movement, communications, and equipment endurance are all stressed at once — is how that chain gets tested as a system rather than as parts.
Sources: Based on a Liberation Army Daily report (June 2026), an earlier Chinese Ministry of National Defense report on Gobi Desert ATGM testing (May 2025), and open-source defense references. The official report did not name the system; the HJ-10 identification is based on visual analysis of the published imagery, and system specifications cited here are open-source estimates.
